CAGR of 104% since FY23. Source: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026
What is Quick Commerce?
Quick commerce (Q-commerce) refers to the on-demand delivery of a broad range of consumer products — including groceries, fresh produce, household essentials, electronics, personal care, and non-grocery categories — typically within 10 to 30 minutes. The fulfilment model relies on dense networks of micro-warehousing facilities, commonly called dark stores, which are strategically located within 2–3 kilometres of consumer demand clusters. Orders are routed to the nearest dark store and delivered via last-mile delivery partners on two-wheelers.
Q-commerce is distinct from both traditional e-commerce (which accepts longer delivery windows) and food delivery (which serves restaurant meals). It competes most directly with the neighbourhood kirana store, general merchandise retail, and traditional grocery delivery channels. The business model is structurally asset-intensive, requiring significant investment in dark store real estate, inventory management technology, and logistics infrastructure before unit economics are viable at scale.
Between 2018 and 2023, India's online quick commerce market grew at a CAGR of 148–169%. Annual spend per user on Q-commerce increased to approximately ₹13,400 in 2023, from a negligible base in 2018. Online penetration of the retail market stood at approximately 6% in 2023, indicating substantial headroom for growth.
Source: Redseer Strategy Consultants, "Report on Indian Hyperlocal Commerce Opportunity," 18 October 2024, commissioned by Swiggy Limited. As cited in the Swiggy Limited Prospectus (Final Filing Version).
Industry Structure & Competitive Landscape
India's Q-commerce market has evolved into a multi-player competitive arena. According to the Swiggy Prospectus, the primary competitors in this segment include Blinkit (Eternal Limited, formerly Zomato Limited), Zepto, and BB Now (BigBasket, a Tata Group Company). Each platform operates a dark store network model with significant investments in last-mile logistics, proprietary technology, and supply chain infrastructure.
Eternal Limited frames the Q-commerce market as bifurcating between two archetypes: a convenience retailer (positioned on reliability, assortment width, and service quality) and a price-led retailer (positioned on discounts and value). Eternal has positioned Blinkit firmly in the convenience archetype. Swiggy has explicitly articulated the same strategic positioning for Instamart, though it is at an earlier stage of delivering differentiation.
What Makes the Dark Store Model Work
The Q-commerce model requires five structural capabilities to be competitive: (1) a dense dark store network achieving delivery within 10 minutes; (2) a wide SKU assortment — Instamart carries approximately 50,000 SKUs, Blinkit operates at broadly comparable depth; (3) a proprietary technology stack covering replenishment optimisation, store tech (pick-path algorithms), location intelligence, and ad-tech; (4) own-inventory model, which Blinkit shifted to in Q1FY26 and Instamart has operated on from inception; and (5) operating leverage achieved as orders per store per day improve and fixed costs are spread over growing volumes.
Average delivery times and dark store utilisation are therefore central operational metrics. Instamart reported an average of 1,093 orders per dark store per day in Q4FY26, against a total network of 1,143 stores with capacity utilisation of approximately 40%. Blinkit's Eternal overview discloses store-level data on an annual basis.
| Parameter | Blinkit | Instamart | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent Company | Eternal Limited (formerly Zomato Ltd.) | Swiggy Limited | BSE/NSE listed |
| Launch Year (Q-commerce) | 2021 (Grofers rebrand); Blinkit acquisition closed Aug 2022 | 2020 (Instamart) | — |
| Business Model | 1P inventory (own inventory, from Q1FY26) | Primarily 3P merchant model with fulfilment services from Aug 2023 | Revenue definitions differ |
| Key Metric Reported | NOV (Net Order Value, after all discounts) | GOV (Gross Order Value, before discounts) and NOV separately | NOV is comparable between both |
| Dark Store Sizes | Self-leased + franchised | Leasehold basis via subsidiary (Scootsy) | — |
| Named Competitors | Zepto, BB Now (BigBasket) | Per Swiggy Prospectus | |
Sources: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026; Swiggy Limited Prospectus (Final Filing Version); Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026. Redseer Report as cited in Swiggy Prospectus.
Blinkit (Eternal Limited): Scale, Growth & Profitability
Blinkit, operated under Eternal Limited (formerly Zomato Limited), has been the fastest-scaling Q-commerce platform in India. Acquired by Zomato in August 2022, Blinkit's annual Net Order Value has grown at a CAGR of 104% between FY23 and FY26. In FY26, Blinkit contributed 52% of Eternal's total B2C Net Order Value, making it the company's single largest revenue driver by this metric.
Blinkit delivered Adjusted EBITDA break-even ahead of the market consensus, achieving this milestone in Q3FY26, and registered a positive Adjusted EBITDA margin of +0.3% of NOV in Q4FY26. Eternal's management attributes this improvement to supply chain cost efficiencies, a favourable mix shift towards long-tail (non-grocery) categories, and operating leverage from its expanded store network. Mature cities — including Delhi NCR — are reported to already be approaching steady-state Adjusted EBITDA margins of 5–6% of NOV.
Source: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026. FY23 data: Q1/Q2FY23 numbers are unaudited, MIS-based as received from Blinkit (per Eternal disclosure). Consolidation from 10 August 2022 (transaction closing date).
Annual Operating Metrics: Blinkit (FY23–FY26)
| Metric | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | YoY Growth (FY26) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual NOV (₹ Cr) | 5,690 | 10,503 | 22,371 | 48,567 | +117% |
| Monthly Transacting Customers (Mn) | 2.9 | 5.1 | 10.2 | 22.1 | +117% |
| Store Count (end of period) | 377 | 526 | 1,301 | 2,243 | +72% |
| Contribution Margin (% of NOV) | -7.8% | +2.5% | +4.3% | +5.0% | — |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin (% of NOV) | -17.8% | -3.7% | -1.3% | -0.6% | — |
Source: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026. Notes: (1) Monthly transacting customers are averages for the period. (2) Store count refers to stores live as at end of period. (3) FY23 data for Q1/Q2 are unaudited MIS-based numbers; consolidation from 10 August 2022. (4) Adj. EBITDA margin of +0.3% reported for Q4FY26 specifically; FY26 full-year average shown above.
Eternal Limited expects Blinkit to grow at a CAGR of 60%+ over the next three years, driven by assortment expansion, geographic expansion, and demand densification. The company is on track to reach approximately 3,000 stores by March 2027. Steady-state Adjusted EBITDA margin expectation: 5–6% of NOV. Eternal's overall B2C NOV (food delivery + Q-commerce + going-out) is expected to double to US$20 billion by FY28 from over US$10 billion in FY26.
Source: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026.
Instamart (Swiggy Limited): Scale, Growth & Profitability
Instamart, Swiggy Limited's quick commerce offering, has delivered consistent GOV growth across FY26, with Q4FY26 GOV reaching ₹7,881 crore — a 68.8% YoY increase and the second successive quarter of maintaining GOV above ₹7,800 crore. The platform's monthly transacting users reached 13.3 million in Q4FY26, and its dark store network stood at 1,143 stores across 129 cities with a total footprint exceeding 4.8 million square feet.
The most significant narrative in Instamart's FY26 story is its rapid improvement in unit economics. Contribution margin improved by 450 basis points within a single year — from -5.6% of GOV in Q4FY25 to -1.1% of GOV in March 2026. Management has attributed this to higher monetisation (advertising and take-rate expansion), larger basket sizes (AOV grew 33% YoY to ₹700), operating leverage in both fixed and semi-variable costs, and deliberate rationalisation of consumer incentives — particularly pivoting away from low-AOV orders and direct wallet subsidies.
The Average Order Value (AOV) of ₹700 in Q4FY26, representing a 33% YoY increase, reflects a sustained shift towards non-grocery and larger-basket buying behaviour. The NOV-to-GOV ratio improved by 330 basis points over the fiscal year, from 68.7% to 72%, indicating more disciplined discounting. However, AOV declined sequentially from ₹746 in Q3FY26 to ₹700 in Q4FY26, as did GOV (from ₹7,938 Cr to ₹7,881 Cr), a deliberate consequence of deprioritising volume growth in favour of margin integrity.
Source: Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026. Audited by Walker Chandiok & Co LLP (for year ended 31 March 2026).
Quarterly Operating Metrics: Instamart
| Metric | Q4FY25 | Q1FY26 | Q2FY26 | Q3FY26 | Q4FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Order Value / GOV (₹ Cr) | 4,670 | 5,655 | 7,022 | 7,938 | 7,881 |
| Net Order Value / NOV (₹ Cr) | 3,549 | 4,185 | 4,915 | 5,477 | 5,675 |
| NOV as % of GOV | 76% | 74% | 70% | 69% | 72% |
| Total Orders (Mn) | 88.6 | 92.4 | 100.8 | 106.4 | 112.6 |
| Average Order Value / AOV (₹ per order) | 527 | 612 | 697 | 746 | 700 |
| Monthly Transacting Users / MTU (Mn) | 9.8 | 11.1 | 12.0 | 12.8 | 13.3 |
| Active Dark Stores (exit count) | 1,021 | 1,062 | 1,102 | 1,136 | 1,143 |
| Orders per Dark Store per Day (#) | 1,190 | 985 | 1,025 | 1,034 | 1,093 |
| Active Dark Store Area (Mn sq ft) | 3.97 | 4.30 | 4.59 | 4.79 | 4.81 |
| GOV per Unit Area (₹ per sq ft) | 11,762 | 13,163 | 15,287 | 16,571 | 16,391 |
| Contribution Margin (% of GOV) | -5.6% | -4.6% | -2.6% | -2.5% | -1.8% |
| Adjusted EBITDA (₹ Cr) | -840 | -896 | -849 | -908 | -858 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin (% of GOV) | -18.0% | -15.8% | -12.1% | -11.4% | -10.9% |
| Adjusted Revenue (₹ Cr) | 733 | 859 | 1,038 | 1,052 | 1,090 |
Notes: (1) Active Dark Stores: stores with at least one completed order on the last day of the period. (2) Orders per dark store per day is based on active darkstore-days. (3) NOV = GOV less all discounts (platform or partner funded). (4) Q4FY26 CM improved further to -1.1% for the month of March 2026 specifically. Source: Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026. Audited financials per Walker Chandiok & Co LLP, Bengaluru, 8 May 2026.
Swiggy management has guided for contribution margin break-even by Q1FY27 (in line with guidance set in Q4FY25). The medium-term aspirational target is a Net Order Value business in excess of ₹1 lakh crore with 4–5% Adjusted EBITDA margins. The company expects capex investments to reduce materially in FY27, having built out significant dark store and warehousing infrastructure headroom over the prior two years.
Source: Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026.
Head-to-Head: Q4FY26 Comparison
The table below places both platforms side-by-side on metrics where the data period and definitions are directly comparable. Blinkit Q4FY26 data is as reported in the Eternal Company Overview (April 2026); Instamart Q4FY26 data is from the Swiggy Shareholders' Letter (8 May 2026). Where definitions differ, they are noted.
Blinkit reports NOV (Net Order Value, after all discounts) as its primary volume metric; Instamart reports both GOV (Gross Order Value, before discounts) and separately states NOV. For a like-for-like revenue comparison, Q4FY26 NOV is the correct metric: Blinkit ₹14,386 Cr vs Instamart ₹5,675 Cr. Blinkit also shifted to a 1P (own inventory) model in Q1FY26, which affects revenue and adjusted EBITDA definitions relative to Instamart's primarily 3P model.
| Metric · Q4FY26 | Blinkit | Instamart | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Order Value / NOV (₹ Cr) | 14,386 | 5,675 | Quarterly; comparable metric |
| GOV (₹ Cr, Instamart only) | — | 7,881 | Blinkit does not separately report GOV (reports NOV) |
| Monthly Transacting Customers / Users (Mn) | 22.1 (FY26 avg.) | 13.3 | Blinkit is FY26 annual avg.; Instamart is Q4FY26 quarterly avg. |
| Store / Dark Store Count | 2,243 | 1,143 | Blinkit: end-FY26; Instamart: end-Q4FY26 (exit count) |
| Contribution Margin | +5.0% of NOV (FY26 annual) | -1.8% of GOV | Blinkit is FY26 annual; Instamart is Q4FY26. Different base (NOV vs GOV) |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin | +0.3% of NOV (Q4FY26) | -10.9% of GOV | Both are Q4FY26; base differs (NOV vs GOV) |
| Profitability Milestone | Achieved break-even (Q3FY26) | Targeting CM break-even by Q1FY27 | — |
| Steady-State Adj. EBITDA Guidance | 5–6% of NOV | 4–5% of GOV | Medium-term management guidance |
| Business Model | 1P (own inventory, from Q1FY26) | Primarily 3P + fulfilment services | Affects revenue and margin definitions |
Sources: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026 (Blinkit data); Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026 (Instamart data). Direct quarterly comparison of all metrics is limited by differing reporting periods and base metric definitions.
Sources: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026; Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026.
The Profitability Divergence
The single most important divergence between Blinkit and Instamart is on the profitability timeline. Blinkit has completed its journey from deep losses to break-even and is now guiding for 5–6% steady-state Adjusted EBITDA margins. Instamart is mid-trajectory, having improved its contribution margin by 450 basis points in a year, but with Adjusted EBITDA still at -10.9% of GOV in Q4FY26.
The structural drivers of Blinkit's margin improvement, as disclosed by Eternal, include: supply chain cost efficiencies achieved through scale; a favourable category mix shift towards higher-margin non-grocery (long-tail) categories; and operating leverage as the store network matures. Blinkit moved to a 1P inventory model in Q1FY26, which structurally improves margins by capturing gross profit directly but also increases capital intensity.
Instamart's strategy has focused on a different set of levers: pivoting away from low-AOV consumers (halving their share of orders), shifting consumer incentives from direct wallet subsidies towards habit-building mechanisms, expanding advertising monetisation, and extracting operating leverage from the existing ~40% capacity utilised store network. Management has stated it is "perhaps the only player in the industry who has made such rapid progress in the CM trajectory in a short time."
Note: Metrics are NOT directly comparable — Blinkit uses annual NOV as base; Instamart uses quarterly GOV as base. Chart illustrates trajectory of improvement, not absolute parity. Sources: Eternal Company Overview, April 2026; Swiggy Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026.
Blinkit Profitability Progression (Annual)
| Metric | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contribution Margin (% of NOV) | -7.8% | +2.5% | +4.3% | +5.0% |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin (% of NOV) | -17.8% | -3.7% | -1.3% | -0.6% |
| Q4FY26 Specific: Adj. EBITDA Margin | — | — | — | +0.3% of NOV |
Source: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026. FY26 Adj. EBITDA margin is the annual figure (-0.6%); Q4FY26 specifically was +0.3% per Eternal disclosure.
Strategic Positioning
Both platforms have converged on the same strategic positioning thesis: Q-commerce players must choose between being a convenience-led platform or a value/price-led one, and the long-term winners in India will be those who win on convenience, assortment, and reliability rather than discounting. The strategic question is which platform can more credibly execute on this positioning whilst managing the unit economics of a capital-intensive fulfilment model.
Blinkit: Aggressive Expansion with Improving Economics
Blinkit's strategy is characterised by an aggressive store network roll-out, targeting approximately 3,000 stores by March 2027 from 2,243 at end-FY26. This expansion is supported by having already reached contribution margin positivity and Adjusted EBITDA break-even. Eternal's management notes that growth will be driven by assortment expansion, geographic expansion, and demand densification — three levers that do not require proportional store additions once network density is achieved. Blinkit benefits from Hyperpure (Eternal's B2B food supply chain) for supplier relationships and quality produce procurement.
Instamart: Differentiation Over Commoditisation
Instamart's strategic focus, articulated in the Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, is on platform differentiation rather than price competition. CEO Sriharsha Majety described the quick delivery space as "increasingly becoming a commoditised market" and affirmed that Instamart's long-term success will be "differentiation-led and not value/price-led." Specific initiatives include Noice (a clean-label private brand with demonstrated stickiness), expanded non-grocery assortment (~50,000 SKUs), and the positioning of Instamart as a "destination for everyday upgrades as opposed to just everyday essentials."
On store expansion, Swiggy management has adopted a measured approach: with current utilisation at approximately 40%, it can "comfortably double our business without the need to add additional stores." New store operationalisation requires less than 90 days from decision, providing agility. Top-decile stores across geographies are operating at 3–5% contribution margin; the most mature city is approaching 3% CM at the consolidated city level.
Blinkit is in aggressive footprint expansion mode — from 1,301 stores end-FY25 to 2,243 end-FY26, and targeting ~3,000 by March 2027. Instamart has added only 122 net new stores in FY26 (1,021 in Q4FY25 to 1,143 in Q4FY26), deliberately moderating pace to optimise existing network utilisation and unit economics. Swiggy management characterises this not as caution but as a deliberate strategy to build durable economics before accelerating volume growth.
Sources: Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026; Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026.
Management Outlook & Guidance
| Guidance Item | Blinkit (Eternal Limited) | Instamart (Swiggy Limited) |
|---|---|---|
| NOV / Volume Growth CAGR Guidance | 60%+ CAGR over next 3 years | Growing towards NOV of ₹1 lakh crore+ (medium term) |
| Store Count Target | ~3,000 stores by Mar-27 | Expansion to be derivative of growth and utilisation; no specific store count target disclosed |
| Contribution Margin Target | Positive (achieved in FY26 at +5.0% of NOV) | Break-even targeted by Q1FY27 |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin — Steady State | 5–6% of NOV | 4–5% of NOV (medium term) |
| Adj. EBITDA Break-even | Achieved in Q3FY26; +0.3% in Q4FY26 | Not guided; contribution margin break-even is the current milestone |
| Capital Expenditure Outlook | Continued investment in store expansion (₹494 Cr in Q4FY26) | Capex to reduce materially in FY27; significant headroom created in dark store and warehousing infrastructure |
| Medium-Term NOV / Revenue Ambition | US$20 billion in B2C NOV (consolidated Eternal) by FY28 | Instamart NOV exceeding ₹1 lakh crore (medium term) |
Sources: Eternal Limited Company Overview, April 2026; Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter, 8 May 2026. All guidance figures represent management statements as publicly disclosed and are forward-looking in nature; they should not be construed as forecasts or investment recommendations.
Definitions of Key Terms
The following definitions are as adopted by the respective companies in their public disclosures and are reproduced for clarity of interpretation.
Total monetary value of completed orders at MRP of goods sold, gross of any discounts, plus user delivery charges, packaging charges, fees from users, and taxes, excluding tips. (Swiggy/Instamart definition)
GOV less all discounts (whether platform or partner funded). The primary volume metric for Blinkit; also disclosed separately for Instamart. (Both companies)
GOV divided by total orders (Instamart). GOV divided by total orders (Blinkit). (Both companies)
Adjusted Revenue less delivery and other charges, less platform-funded discounts, less cost of fulfilment services, less other variable costs, as a percentage of GOV.
Adjusted Revenue less cost of goods sold (own inventory), less dark store operations cost, delivery costs, warehouse expenses, customer subsidies, wastage, and other variable costs — as a % of NOV.
EBITDA (profit/loss excluding tax, depreciation and amortisation, finance costs) plus share-based payment expense, minus rental expenses pertaining to Ind AS 116 leases. (Both companies, same definition)
Dark stores with at least one completed order on the last day of the period/year. (Swiggy definition)
Number of stores live as at the end of the period. (Eternal definition)
A micro-logistics facility which stocks and manages a variety of SKUs owned by merchant partners (or, in Blinkit's 1P model, the platform itself). Designed for rapid order picking and last-mile fulfilment within 2–3 km. (Swiggy Prospectus)
Number of unique users (identified by mobile number) that have completed at least one order in a month, averaged for all months in the period. (Both companies)
Definitions sourced from: Swiggy Limited Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter (8 May 2026); Eternal Limited Company Overview (April 2026); Swiggy Limited Prospectus (Final Filing Version).
Sources & Methodology
All data in this report is sourced exclusively from the following primary, publicly disclosed documents. No social media, Wikipedia, blog, or unverified third-party sources have been used. No data has been extrapolated beyond what is stated in these documents.
- SOURCE ASwiggy Limited — Q4FY26 Shareholders' Letter
Dated: 8 May 2026. Published by Swiggy Limited (formerly known as Swiggy Private Limited, Bundi Technologies Private Limited). Audited by Walker Chandiok & Co LLP, Bengaluru. Financial results for the quarter and year ended 31 March 2026. CIN: L74110KA2013PLC096530. Available at: www.swiggy.com and stock exchange websites www.bseindia.com and www.nseindia.com. - SOURCE BEternal Limited — Company Overview
Dated: April 2026. Published by Eternal Limited (formerly known as Zomato Limited). Covers business segments: Zomato food delivery, Blinkit quick commerce, District (going-out), Hyperpure (B2B supplies), and Feeding India. Financial data covers FY22–FY26 (annual) and Q4FY25–Q4FY26 (quarterly bridge). - SOURCE CSwiggy Limited — Prospectus (Final Filing Version)
Filed by Swiggy Limited in connection with its Initial Public Offering. Contains industry data sourced from: Redseer Strategy Consultants Private Limited, "Report on Indian Hyperlocal Commerce Opportunity," dated 18 October 2024 (commissioned and paid for by Swiggy Limited). The Redseer Report is an independent third-party report; its findings are referenced as cited and attributed accordingly. Note: the Redseer Report was exclusively commissioned by Swiggy; readers should apply appropriate judgement regarding commissioned research.
Disclaimer: This report has been prepared by SBSI Research for informational purposes only. All financial data and management commentary have been sourced verbatim or closely paraphrased from publicly disclosed company documents as cited above. No data has been independently verified beyond what appears in these documents, and no extrapolation has been performed. This report does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation to buy or sell securities, or a solicitation of any kind.
Forward-looking statements (guidance figures, medium-term targets, store expansion plans) are those of the respective companies' managements and are subject to risks and uncertainties. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should refer to the full original documents for complete context and risk disclosures.
Comparisons between Blinkit and Instamart must be interpreted with care, as the two companies operate under different business models (1P vs. 3P), report on different fiscal calendars relative to the data available (annual vs. quarterly), and use different base metrics for margin calculation (NOV vs. GOV).